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on the evolution of NATO and its consequences for WEU 
The Assembly 
( i) Emphasising the importance of the NATO summit meeting reaffirming its attachment to transatlan-
tic links on the basis of a substantial presence of United States forces in Europe and the direct engagement 
of the North Atlantic allies in the security of Europe; 
(ii) Endorsing the partnership for peace programme offered by NATO to the countries taking part in the 
work of NACC and other interested CSCE countries; 
(iii) Noting nevertheless that the Atlantic Alliance has not yet managed to define in a coherent manner 
the nature of its relations with Russia and the CIS, nor the shape of a security system including the coun-
tries of Central Europe that will satisfy the aspirations and appease the concerns of all sides; 
(iv) Emphasising consequently the importance ofWEU's role with a view to helping to maintain stabi-
lity and security in the East; 
(v) Also emphasising the importance of the greater role played by WEU in the framework of its co-ope-
ration with NATO with regard to peace-keeping and crisis-management missions; 
(vi) Strongly welcoming the decision of the heads of state and of government of the Atlantic Alliance to 
uphold the strengthening of the European pillar of that alliance through WEU and their readiness to make 
the collective assets of the alliance available to WEU; 
(vii) Recalling at the same time that since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty WEU has 
become an integral part of the development of the European Union and is required to work out and imple-
ment the decisions of the Union that have defence and security implications; 
(viii) Consequently recalling that the Council has to take as a matter of urgency a series of important deci-
sions to make WEU a truly operational organisation and to respond to expectations and the increased res-
ponsibilities entrusted to it; 
(ix) Convinced nevertheless that the WEU Council now needs special political impetus to overcome its 
difficulties in reaching the necessary decisions; 
(x) Considering that the intention of the ministers to reduce to six months the duration of the Chair-
manship-in-Office of WEU in order to facilitate the harmonisation of the presidencies of the European 
Union and of WEU calls for new measures to ensure the continuity of WEU's political planning in order 
to accelerate the process of decision-taking and to ensure a better hearing for WEU's voice in alliance and 
European Union bodies; 
(xi) Insisting on the need to associate the Assembly to a greater extent in the Council's thinking before 
the latter takes decisions or decides not to take them in the absence of the necessary unanimity, 
REcOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. At its next ministerial meeting, grant simultaneously to all the member countries of the Forum of 
Consultation an associate status in WEU enabling them to participate to the greatest possible extent in the 
work of the Council and of its subsidiary bodies without prejudice to the status of associate member accor-
ded to Iceland, Norway and Turkey as members of NATO; 
2. Conclude its work on strategic mobility and inform the Assembly of its conclusions; 
3. Decide before the end of this year: 
- to establish a European system of space-based observation in accordance with the results of the 
feasibility study; 
- to move from the feasibility study phase to the conclusion of a contract with European industry 
for building the European military transport aircraft; 
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-to create a European air-maritime force reinforced by ground components; 
- to agree on the conditions for the use and command of the European corps which is to be placed 
under the political direction of WEU in conformity with the agreements already concluded with 
SACEUR; 
- to make arrangements for associating with the European corps the other forces answerable to 
WEU so as to allow a European rapid action force to be created; 
- to create a European armaments agency with effective responsibilities and powers in order to 
achieve true co-operation between member states and their industries on questions of materiel; 
4. Increase the means and enlarge the field of action of the Planning Cell by giving it a true role of ope-
rational co-ordination between WEU and NATO based on overall guidelines, including contingency plans 
and the planning of joint manoeuvres of forces answerable to WEU; 
5. Harmonise with NATO the concept of combined joint task forces (CJTF) with its own concept of 
forces answerable to WEU (FA WEU); 
6. Harmonise its working relationship with the European Union in matters that might have repercus-
sions on its co-operation with NATO; 
7. Show greater determination in its relations with the United Nations and the CSCE with a view to 
possible missions by offering them its operational capabilities in peace-keeping and crisis-management 
questions; 
8. Draw up political guidelines for meetings of chiefs of defence staff and specify forthwith a struc-
ture of relations and the sharing of responsibilities between: 
- chiefs of defence staff; 
- military delegates belonging to national delegations; 
- the Planning Cell and 
-the WEU Secretariat-General; 
9. Ensure the continuity of its political planning by giving the WEU Secretary-General political 
powers including: 
-the right of initiative; 
-the right to convene and to chair meetings of the Council of Ministers; 
-primordial responsibility for making WEU's voice heard in alliance and European Union bodies; 
10. Ensure in particular the participation of the Secretary-General of WEU in meetings of the common 
foreign and security policy (CFSP) authorities of the European Union in the same spirit of transparency, 
complementarity and reciprocity that already exists between WEU and NATO; 
11. Ratify the decisions set out in paragraph 3 above and give the political impetus necessary for WEU 
to take its place as the European defence organisation and as a credible player in its areas of responsibil-
ity by convening before the end of the year an extraordinary meeting of heads of state and of government 




(submitted by Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. Considering the results of the NATO sum-
mit meeting on lOth and 11th January last, which, 
as will be recalled, was convened at the initiative 
of the United States to reaffirm NATO's impor-
tance as a political instrument of the United States 
Government in the eyes of public opinion, it is 
difficult to discern a coherent concept and a firm 
direction in which the alliance might be prepared 
to evolve. Nor is it possible in view of the multi-
plicity of intentions and programmes referred to 
in the declaration issued after the meeting of 
heads of state and of government of the North 
Atlantic Council in Brussels. 
2. It can be clearly deduced, however, that the 
alliance is pursuing its process of transformation, 
relegating increasingly to second place the 
conventional military and political tasks which, 
since its creation, had allowed it to ensure the 
security and freedom of Western Europe under the 
wing of the United States. This long period of 
time was brought to a close with the end of the 
East-West confrontation and, starting with the 
Rome summit meeting, NATO had to work out a 
new strategy and adapt the allied military posture 
to the fundamental changes of the international 
situation in security matters. 
3. What is crystal-clear from the very outset is 
that in Brussels, NATO postponed any decision 
regarding the possible extension of security gua-
rantees to the East by proposing, in exchange, to 
the countries of Central Europe which wished to 
join NATO and also all the countries of Eastern 
Europe, Russia, Ukraine and the countries of Cen-
tral Asia, a partnership for peace programme 
based on individual agreements governing the 
participation of interested countries in the politi-
cal and military activities of NATO and particu-
larly peace-keeping operations. 
4. Furthermore, NATO has set itself a number 
of new programmes and tasks, the achievement of 
which calls for a decisive reinforcement of the 
role of the European allies. Mention is made in 
particular of crisis-management and peace-keep-
ing tasks and the introduction of the combined 
joint task force concept, to be harmonised with 
the procedure drawn up in WEU regarding the 
designation by member states of forces answer-
able to WEU. 
5. For the first time in its history, NATO, with 
the agreement of the United States, confirmed 
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unambiguously its support for the European secu-
rity and defence identity and stated that it was 
ready to give WEU increased responsibilities as 
European pillar of the alliance. In this context, the 
fact that NATO is "ready to make collective assets 
of the alliance available ... for WEU operations 
undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of 
their common foreign and security policy" is of 
fundamental importance. 
6. Regarding the assessment of new security 
risks, the summit meeting did nothing about pre-
senting a global and coherent view but preferred 
to mention a number of problems here and there 
in its declaration. Thus the heads of state and of 
government started by noting that "other causes of 
instability, tension and conflict have emerged", 
without specifying their origins, background or 
importance. In another context, they expressed 
their concern about the situation in the Southern 
Caucasus and security in the Mediterranean and 
deplored the continuing conflict in former Yugo-
slavia. The risks stemming from the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction are mentioned 
several times and also the threat from acts of ter-
rorism. Finally, NATO confrrms the importance it 
attaches to arms control and disarmament agree-
ments and the extension of the treaty on non-pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons, the entry into force 
of the convention on chemical weapons and the 
negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. 
7. The multiplicity of the alliance's ambitions 
must not be allowed, however, to conceal the fun-
damental absence of an overall concept for a 
Euro-Atlantic security policy covering Central 
and Eastern Europe and the Community of Inde-
pendent States (CIS). 
8. Unlike the situation in 1945 when plans 
were drawn up - mainly by the Americans - for 
rebuilding Europe and the introduction of a new 
post-war order, no one was prepared for the major 
changes of 1989 and subsequent years. Three 
years after the disbandment of the Soviet Union, 
the West has still not agreed on a policy to be pur-
sued with regard to Russia, Ukraine and the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe, be it in secu-
rity matters or in assistance to those countries to 
build up their economic and democratic struc-
tures. 
9. The new world order advocated by Presi-
dent Bush quickly disappeared into thin air and, 
as can be seen from the United States' long hesi-
tation about playing an active role in the fighting 
in Bosnia, the determination to establish Ameri-
can leadership accompanied by commitments in 
European security matters is less and less visible. 
The fact that Americans and Europeans finally 
agreed on the ultimatum against Serbia on 9th 
February last cannot be considered as a sign that 
the overall policy of the United States is turning 
back towards Europe. Furthermore, there is grow-
ing evidence of Russia's return to the internatio-
nal stage - its role in the Bosnian affair after 
NATO's ultimatum to Serbia is one of the most 
striking examples but not the only one. This 
should be even greater encouragement to the Uni-
ted States to deal directly with this new Russia to 
work out a policy of crisis-management, and to 
consider questions of global strategy as a matter 
of primary concern for the two great world 
powers, thus again linking up with the bilatera-
lism that already existed at the time of the Soviet 
Union. 
10. If there is no longer true American leader-
ship in the Euro-Atlantic framework, Europe must 
prepare itself to shoulder this task, at least in cer-
tain areas, an undertaking which is certainly very 
ambitious in view of Europe's loss of credibility 
after demonstrating its inability to take action in 
the fighting in former Yugoslavia. 
11. If Europe needs new impetus to launch 
meaningful initiatives in order to take control of 
its own security and also to define and implement 
a credible collective security system covering the 
countries of the East, the NATO summit meeting 
can provide the basis since it gave Europeans a 
very clear and very broad mandate. 
12. The common foreign and security policy is 
still being worked out in the framework of the 
European Union whose structures are not yet ope-
rational enough to allow it to take on this role. 
Furthermore, it is not yet fmalised and its ability 
to produce an agreement was seriously called in 
question during the recent negotiations on the 
accession of Austria, Finland, Norway and Swe-
den. Conversely, the only fully operational struc-
ture in terms of security policy is the WEU Coun-
cil. That is the body that will have to handle the 
definition and implementation of Europe's secur-
ity concept which is still awaited. To that end, all 
its member countries will have to demonstrate the 
necessary political determination because the 
tasks are many and there is no time to be lost. 
II. Ensuring stability in the East 
13. Russia's return to the international stage is 
coming at a time when its difficulties in establi-
shing a firm framework for developing lasting 
democratic institutions are far from having been 
overcome and it is still struggling in its efforts to 
convert to a market economy. The fact that Rus-
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sian leaders feel they are responsible for the secu-
rity of all the territories of the former Soviet 
Union and in particular of the 25 million Russians 
in what Moscow calls its "near abroad", the fact 
that in the United Nations or the CSCE Russia is 
claiming priority for peace-keeping action in 
areas of conflict within the Community of Inde-
pendent States (CIS), its hesitation to withdraw 
troops from Estonia, Latvia and Transdnestr and 
its firm opposition to any extension of NATO 
towards the East are all matters of great concern 
to the countries of Central Europe. This attitude is 
above all a challenge to the West which has still 
not managed to define in a coherent manner the 
nature of its relations with Russia and the ways 
and means for that country to take part in a secu-
rity architecture which might meet the aspirations 
and appease the concern of all sides. 
14. The alliance's response to that challenge 
has been ambiguous: on the one hand, it has affrr-
med its intention to strengthen security and stabi-
lity in the whole of Europe and to remain open to 
other European states by evoking the prospect of 
enlarging NATO towards the East as an evolving 
process while avoiding geographical details. On 
the other hand, it has launched a partnership for 
peace programme open to the countries of NACC 
and also other countries of the CSCE. This pro-
gramme proposes that they take part in the work 
of the political and military organs of NATO and 
co-operate with that organisation but in such a 
manner that most of the obligations are incumbent 
on the countries invited. 
15. This programme must allow NATO to verify 
transparency in national defence planning and 
budgeting processes, democratic control of defence 
forces in the countries concerned and their readi-
ness to contribute to operations under the authority 
of the United Nations and/or the responsibility of 
theCSCE. 
16. Furthermore, these countries must fund 
their own participation in partnership activities. In 
exchange, NATO undertakes to consult with any 
active participant in the partnership if that partner 
perceives a direct tlrreat to its territorial integrity, 
political independence, or security. The latter pro-
vision is perhaps the one of greatest interest to the 
countries invited. 
17. The method whereby each state subscri-
bing to the framework document of the pro-
gramme is to establish with NATO an individual 
partnership programme allows the formula to be 
adapted to the various situations of the countries 
in question without discrimination. While this 
programme has the advantage of avoiding new 
divisions in Eastern Europe,· its ultimate aims and 
the limits of its goals compared with those of 
NACC are still far from clear. 
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18. Whereas in March twelve countries of the 
East had already joined the partnership for peace, 
i.e. the Baltic countries, Hungary, Moldova, 
Kazakhstan, Poland, Romania and Ukraine, Rus-
sia, for its part, has only recently made known its 
intention of participating in this programme. It 
would seem, however, that it is not over-enthu-
siastic about this question and it prefers to conti-
nue to count on the development of the activities 
and responsibilities of NACC and an enlargement 
of that body which it believes should become 
totally independent of NATO. Moreover, the Rus-
sians feel they were not consulted regarding the 
preparation of NATO's ultimatum against Serbia 
which, in their opinion, did nothing to strengthen 
the credibility of the partnership for peace pro-
gramme which they considered too technical and 
not political enough. 
19. For WEU, what are the implications of the 
evolution of NATO's relations with the countries 
of the East on the basis of the partnership for 
peace? The enhanced status that the WEU Coun-
cil is prepared to offer the nine countries of the 
WEU Forum of Consultation was so far primarily 
intended to respect a certain parallelism with the 
evolution of the relations the European Union is 
establishing with the countries of Central Europe. 
A consequence of this has already been to limit 
considerably the number of countries that might 
benefit from the new status offered by WEU com-
pared with the number of countries invited to take 
part in the partnership for peace in the framework 
of NATO. 
20. It should also be noted that the WEU Coun-
cil preceded the Twelve in establishing contacts 
with Central Europe by inviting nine countries of 
Central Europe to take part in the Forum, whereas 
the Twelve concentrated first on six of them, their 
relations with the Baltic countries not yet having 
resulted in the conclusion of Europe agreements 
similar to those signed with the Visegrad group of 
countries, Bulgaria and Romania. 
21. In the meantime, the Twelve have started 
negotiations with the Baltic countries on free 
trade agreements which are considered as a means 
of preparing the ground for subsequently inclu-
ding these countries among those that have 
concluded Europe agreements. This will allow 
WEU to include the Baltic countries among those 
which will benefit from enhanced status on the 
basis of the Franco-German proposal of 12th 
November last. This status could be offered 
simultaneously to the nine countries of the Forum. 
Any dilatory solution on the pretext that the Baltic 
countries have not yet reached Europe agreements 
with the European Union would be dangerous and 
might convey the wrong message. 
22. Regarding the content of the enhanced sta-
tus that is to be offered to the countries of the 
Forum of Consultation on 9th May next, one must 
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not forget that there is also a synergy between 
WEU and NATO and any strengthening of 
WED's relations with the countries of the East 
must automatically be of interest to the alliance 
and the United States in particular. WEU must 
therefore hold consultations forthwith on the final 
aims of its new relations with the countries of the 
Forum and keep its alliance partners informed. 
23. For the time being, it is planned to base 
WED's new relations with the countries of the 
Forum solely on a political document, without 
juridical implications, which will allow the coun-
tries concerned to take part in meetings of the 
Council without being able to block its decisions, 
establish links with the Planning Cell, the Insti-
tute for Security Studies, the Secretariat-General 
and the Chairmanship-in-Office, take part in the 
tasks set out in the Petersberg declaration (huma-
nitarian peace-keeping missions, crisis-manage-
ment, including operations to restore peace) and 
to be informed about the activities of working 
groups with a possibility of being invited to take 
part, with particular regard to the Council's Wor-
king Group. Their participation will therefore be 
substantial enough for the term status of associa-
tion to be justified and desirable. That does not 
prevent procedure being worked out to preserve 
the associate status of Iceland, Norway and Tur-
key as members of NATO. 
24. There will no doubt be parallelism between 
certain activities of WEU in the framework of 
enhanced co-operation with the countries of the 
Forum, particularly in peace-keeping, and those 
that NATO will establish with the partnership for 
peace countries. That is normal if WEU is consi-
dered as European pillar of the alliance. However, 
the aim of the associate status granted to the coun-
tries of the Forum in the framework of WEU is to 
prepare the conditions for the full accession of 
those countries to the modified Brussels Treaty 
and the alliance must be as aware of this as the 
European Union. 
25. It is therefore necessary to develop without 
delay a doctrine to determine to what extent a 
country that is not a member of NATO can be 
associated with WEU and whether it can even-
tually become a full member. The WEU declara-
tion appended to the Maastricht Treaty gives an 
indication in this respect since it invites Ireland 
-a member of the Union but not of NATO- to 
become a full member of WEU (although that 
country has so far preferred the status of obser-
ver), but the case of Ireland cannot be compared 
automatically with that of countries of Central 
Europe. A similar problem will arise, moreover, 
when Austria, Finland and Sweden join the Euro-
pean Union. 
26. However WEU must also take a position on 
the nature of its future relations with Russia, 
Ukraine and the other CIS countries. Here too it 
must take into account its dual function vis-a-vis 
the Union and NATO. Nothing, moreover, in the 
latest WEU declaration from Luxembourg or in 
that issued after the NATO summit meeting gives 
any indication of the political doctrine to be follo-
wed vis-a-vis Russia. It also would appear from a 
recent speech by the WEU Secretary-General 1, in 
which he describes the nature of future relations 
between WEU and Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, 
that the essential aim of contacts with these coun-
tries will be to inform them of WEU initiatives 
and that relations will be established on a bilateral 
basis. These indications are too vague to enable us 
to define what type of relations or even what sort 
of partnership could be developed between WEU 
and these countries. The co-operation that the 
WEU countries have initiated with Russia on a 
case-by-case basis, such as the implementation of 
the Open Skies Treaty for example, could provide 
the stimulus for a political dialogue between 
WEU and Russia and other CIS countries. 
27. Regarding Russia in particular, the French 
Defence Minister, Mr. Leotard, put forward some 
interesting ideas in a speech given at a seminar of 
the European Movement held in Paris on 3rd 
March 1994: 
"Our ambition for Europe, which is based, 
in the West, on the original core organisa-
tion of European countries, must extend 
much further eastward. It is also in our 
interest to make room there for Russia in 
order to offer it the security framework 
which would ensure that this major power 
progresses in the direction we wish to see -
namely towards democracy. Once free of 
the Soviet straight-jacket, Russia's natural 
calling in this modern age -the age of com-
munications, information, space and high 
technologies - must necessarily be to asso-
ciate itself with the European enterprise. 
Would it be so unthinkable, if Russia makes 
good progress down the road to democracy, 
for the security and defence of the conti-
nent of Europe to be organised on the basis 
of a triangle of forces consisting of the Euro-
pean Union, Russia and North America?" 
28. Doubtless these are not the only aspects for 
consideration in the context of a plan for a part-
nership between Europe and the CIS countries -a 
plan which must necessarily envisage among 
other things a strengthening of stable relations 
between Russia and Ukraine. And who could be 
better qualified than the WEU Council to take on 
the task of developing a coherent policy for 
Europe in this area? 
l. "WEU after two Brussels summits: a new approach to 
common talks", Institut royal des relations internationales, 
Brussels, 27th January 1994. 
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29. The prospects open to WEU for asserting 
itself as the European pillar of the alliance in the 
aftermath of the NATO summit meeting offer it the 
opportunity of increasing Europe's weight in the 
alliance, both in determining the framework for a 
global strategy and also, as necessary, outside the 
alliance through direct contacts with the United 
States. The more Europe can make its voice heard 
in a credible fashion the more the Americans will 
be persuaded of their interest in not making funda-
mental decisions without consulting their Euro-
pean allies and the more Europe will be in a posi-
tion to exercise a decisive influence on alliance 
and United States decision-making. It is in this 
optic that the statement contained in the NATO 
declaration that "the alliance and the European 
Union share common strategic interests" should 
find practical expression. 
Ill. Implementation of a new form 
of co-operation 
between WEU and NATO 
30. It has been agreed - and this is one of the 
significant aspects of the declaration following 
the NATO summit meeting and WED's Luxem-
bourg declaration, that the two organisations 
would from now on consult together in the event 
of a crisis, as necessary, within the framework of 
joint meetings of their Permanent Councils. Such 
joint meetings will certainly be useful in certain 
situations. However it must be guaranteed that the 
preparation of WEU ministerial meetings remains 
the exclusive responsibility of its own Permanent 
Council, and that the latter is also free to discuss 
European positions independently in preparing 
ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council. 
31. The essential aspect of the new role the 
Council has devolved to WEU concerns its pro-
mise to "make the collective assets of the alliance 
available, on the basis of consultations in the 
North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations 
undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of 
their common foreign and security policy". The 
alliance has thus responded to the request formu-
lated by WEU at Luxembourg to be able to use 
not only the forces and means of the European 
allies but also the collective assets of the Atlantic 
Alliance, such as communications systems, 
means of command and headquarters staffs. 
32. Even if the possibility thus created of 
WED's being able to draw on NATO means is not 
limited to specific operations, it is nevertheless 
closely linked to the missions for peace-keeping 
and crisis management on which the efforts of the 
two organisations are henceforth likely to be 
concentrated. 
33. In this context the alliance has adopted the 
proposal advanced by the Americans last October 
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at Travemiinde for adopting the combined joint 
task force concept (CJTF) as a "means to facili-
tate contingency operations", including operations 
with participating nations outside the alliance. 
34. Although it may be necessary to wait until 
June 1994, when the NATO Permanent Council 
will have reported to the ministers, for informa-
tion on the details of this project, it is nevertheless 
interesting to note that in a speech delivered at the 
IHEDN on 21st January 1994, The French Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Alain Juppe, stated: 
"In operations where it is clear that the Uni-
ted States for its own reasons does not wish 
to become heavily involved, this type of 
task force could not only be made available 
to Western European Union but also, in 
such cases, placed under its command 
rather than under the authority of SACEUR 
- and this has been explicitly accepted. The 
United States has therefore taken an impor-
tant step forward in agreeing to a modifica-
tion of the traditional chain of command ... " 
35. If this project materialises, these CJTFs 
could be deployed under WEU command with 
material support from NATO (for example 
AWACS). They would function under the orders 
of the operational commander appointed by WEU 
under the political authority of the WEU Council. 
This would constitute a truly revolutionary inno-
vation. 
36. Nevertheless the alliance has stated its rea-
diness to loan its means "on the basis of consulta-
tions within the North Atlantic Council". The pro-
cess is therefore not automatic - which is entirely 
understandable. However it remains to be seen to 
what extent NATO and the Americans will agree 
to waive their right of refusal over a mission deci-
ded by Europeans. Moreover decisions have to be 
taken both as to the composition of the forces 
making up the CJTFs and who will assign them. 
Will they include American units and in what pro-
portion? 
37. This leads us to the problem of knowing 
how the alliance concept will fit in with that of 
"separable but not separate capabilities" and how 
it can be reconciled with that formulated by the 
WEU Council at Petersberg, which envisaged the 
possibility of recourse to "forces answerable to 
WEU'' (FAWEU). Clearly, in the absence of pro-
cedure automatically ensuring that the assets of 
the alliance will be made available to it, WEU 
must maintain its autonomous military planning 
capability and develop its own operational capa-
bility in order to act independently or at the 
request of the European Union. 2 
2. See the speech given by Mr. van Eekelen on 27th January 
1994. 
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38. Up to the present the multinational forces 
under the authority of WEU have consisted of the 
European corps, the (central) multinational divi-
sion and the Anglo-Dutch amphibious force. It 
remains to be determined whether the consent of 
the whole of the Atlantic Alliance will also be 
required to enable WEU to use these units - in 
other words whether the CJTF and the FAWEU 
will be integrated concepts. The status of the 
European corps, whose use by NATO services has 
been agreed between the relevant chiefs-of-staff 
but which is to constitute the nucleus of a force 
placed primarily under WEU command, poses a 
particular problem. 
39. Harmonisation of the concepts of CJTF and 
FAWEU forces implies that WEU must, from the 
outset, be fully involved in NATO thinking in 
order to submit a plan to it that provides, on the 
one hand, for its making its own operational capa-
bilities available to NATO, while ensuring, on the 
other hand, that it is possible for it to engage in 
missions independently or at the request of the 
European Union. 
40. NATO's new role in peace-keeping and cri-
sis-management, which is based on a wide inter-
pretation of Article 4 of the Treaty of Washington 
in order to elicit the necessary consensus in the 
alliance for "out of area" action, will have impor-
tant consequences for WEU, which will be called 
upon to assume the political direction of such ope-
rations, and, in this connection, be able to take 
advantage of the instruments with which it is pro-
vided under the modified Brussels Treaty. 
41. Strong reinforcement measures will need to 
be taken by WEU in its political relations with the 
United Nations and the CSCE, an area where 
WEU has much ground to recover. However, if 
the aim is for WEU to become a credible partner 
in crisis-management and peace-keeping, it will 
be necessary to accelerate the development of its 
operational capabilities so as to enable it to fulfil 
the new tasks assigned to it by the Petersberg 
declaration. It would be especially desirable to 
know the broad thinking behind the report that the 
WEU Chairmanship-in-Office submitted to the 
ministers in Luxembourg on the general role of 
WEU in peace-keeping and on humanitarian mis-
sions. 
42. The shortcomings in co-operation between 
WEU and NATO over management of the conflict 
on the territory of former Yugoslavia- despite the 
success of the joint operation in the Adriatic 
known as operation Sharp Guard - and the new 
situation that has emerged in Bosnia, and particu-
larly in Sarajevo, after the expiry of the NATO 
ultimatum of 21st February, will require a new 
initiative on the part ofWEU.It will be necessary 
to develop a strategy for the pacification of the 
country and for securing the implementation of 
the agreements ultimately reached by the parties. 
In military terms this implies burden-sharing bet-
ween WEU and NATO to guarantee, where neces-
sary, a military presence on the ground of the 
forces of one or other organisation. In political 
terms, WEU will need to develop on behalf of the 
European Union arrangements to guarantee secu-
rity in the region after the cessation of hostilities. 
43. The NATO declaration contains two impor-
tant paragraphs, one concerning the provision of 
preventive measures to counter the threat of proli-
feration of weapons of mass destruction and their 
means of delivery (for example ballistic missiles), 
the other stressing the importance of achieving 
progress on the key issues of arms control and 
disarmament, particularly with regard to the follo-
wing: 
-extension of the treaty on the non-prolife-
ration of nuclear weapons; 
-the entry into force of the convention on 
chemical weapons and the reinforcement 
of the biological weapons convention; 
-the problem of banning nuclear testing; 
-ensuring full compliance with the provi-
sions of the treaty on conventional forces 
in Europe. 
44. The effort to contain proliferation by politi-
cal and defence means is known to be a priority 
concern of the European Union and NATO. It is 
the subject of various proposals, in particular by 
Mr. Aspin and Mr. Kinkel, while the WEU decla-
ration adopted in Luxembourg on 22nd Novem-
ber last makes no reference to this problem. This 
silence is the more surprising given first that the 
WEU Council warmly welcomed the symposium 
on "An anti-missile defence for Europe" organi-
sed by the Assembly in Rome, in March 1993, 
and second that WEU is in the process of acqui-
ring an independent space-based observation and 
surveillance system, necessary for organising a 
defence against the threat of weapons of mass 
destruction. 
45. It is wholly unacceptable for WEU to abdi-
cate from the discussion on the political aspects of 
proliferation in favour of the European Union and 
from the "defence" aspects of the issue in favour 
of NATO. The political dimension of the problem 
clearly impacts on the defence dimension and 
there is no fear of duplicating NATO's work if 
WEU, as its role requires, brings a decisive contri-
bution in the domain of anti-missile protection, 
taking advantage of progress already achieved 
and existing European industrial capabilities. 
IV. WEU facing unprecedented challenges 
46. The achievement of the tasks inherent in 
the dual function of WEU vis-a-vis the Atlantic 
Alliance and the European Union is proving espe-
cially difficult, not simply because WEU is a 
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small organisation, but also because a majority of 
its senior officials regard it essentially from either 
a NATO or a European Union perspective, forget-
ting that it has, by virtue of its founding treaty, 
special features of its own that qualify it specifi-
cally to fulfil its functions. However, for it to be a 
credible partner it is essential for WEU to have 
autonomy of action and for its operational capabi-
lities to be developed rapidly and also indepen-
dently. For this to happen there must first be a 
political will which must then be expressed 
through specifically "WEU" initiatives; without 
this, the organisation will remain in a state of sus-
pense until such time as other organisations such 
as NATO, the United Nations, the CSCE or the 
European Union call upon it to act. 
47. The importance ofWEU's maintaining and 
developing a degree of political autonomy in rela-
tion to the European Union and of ensuring that it 
effectively possesses the necessary operational 
capacities lies in the fact that the organisation is 
vested (under Article IV of the modified Brussels 
Treaty) with the responsibility of providing trans-
atlantic links and co-operating with NATO, a 
position confirmed by the WEU Luxembourg 
declarations and those following the NATO sum-
mit meeting in Brussels reaffirming the political 
will to develop WEU as the means of reinforcing 
the European pillar of the alliance and to make the 
collective assets of the alliance available to it. 
48. WEU alone is able to develop the spirit of 
co-operation and solidarity with NATO by secu-
ring its own operational capabilities. This would 
strengthen the whole alliance, while avoiding 
rivalry and the political and economic problems 
that have arisen recently on either side of the 
Atlantic between the Twelve and the United 
States affecting transatlantic solidarity in security 
and defence matters. 
49. Title V of the Maastricht Treaty, and speci-
fically Article J.4, paragraphs 4 and 5, tends in an 
entirely different direction since it lays down 
conditions and imposes limits to co-operation by 
its member countries within the framework of the 
Atlantic Alliance (as in WEU), without giving the 
slightest indication as to the prospects for co-ope-
ration between the Union and the alliance after the 
so-called "1998 deadline". The repeal of the 
modified Brussels Treaty on which the present 
wording of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty is 
based would also remove the legal bases on which 
the European pillar of the alliance rests and its co-
operation with the alliance. 
50. With a view to preventing such a dangerous 
development, it is necessary to invite the WEU 
Council to take the following measures forthwith: 
determine quickly what its working relations with 
the European Union are to be - this is the main 
theme of the report on WEU in the process of 
European Union, to be submitted by Mr. Ferrari. 
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WEU must insist, as of now, on the results of its 
co-operation with the alliance being accepted and 
its initiatives not being limited or prevented even 
by the European Union authorities, a situation 
which is theoretically possible under Article J.4, 
paragraph 5 of the Maastricht Treaty. 
51. Preliminary consultations should be held 
between WEU and the European Union before the 
latter requests WEU, in conformity with Article 
J .4, paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Maastricht, to 
develop and implement Union decisions with 
defence implications, if the intention is for WEU 
to be capable of assisting the Union with its expert 
knowledge sufficiently quickly and of evaluating 
the impact of any such request on relations with 
the Atlantic Alliance. 
52. In order to achieve this there must be genuine 
political planning in WEU such as does not at pre-
sent exist for various reasons. Neither the Secreta-
ry-General, nor his small political section, have 
the right to take initiatives; it is for the Chairman-
ship-in-Office, at the behest of the member 
governments, to take political initiatives, with 
each member country reserving the right to put 
forward its own proposals. The work that takes 
place within the Council's working groups is also 
dependent on the instructions they receive from 
the capitals of the member countries. Under such 
conditions it seems difficult to guarantee continuity 
of political will- the more so since the term of the 
Chairmanship-in-Office has just been reduced to 
six months in order to bring it into line with that of 
the European Union presidency. Until now it was 
possible to count on Franco-German initiatives, or 
British and Italian, as the case may be, but con-
tinuity of political planning is not guaranteed in 
WEU as it can be in NATO or the European 
Union. This is a problem that must be tackled, 
however difficult it may be to find a solution. 
53. One of the primary objectives might there-
fore be to take the decision to strengthen the 
powers of the Secretary-General by giving him 
the right to make proposals, to chair the Minis-
terial Council- as is the case in NATO- and to 
appoint such staff to his secretariat and acquire 
such material resources as are necessary to ensure 
continuity of the political will of WEU as an auto-
nomous organisation. 
54. Strengthening the powers of the Secretary-
General in this way would also improve the effec-
tiveness of the major organs of WEU - an essen-
tial condition for enabling it to fulfil the mandates 
recently assigned to it- and this should give grea-
ter political impetus to the meetings of the Minis-
terial Council and the Permanent Council. Until 
now, a great deal of time has invariably elapsed 
before the Council was able to take concrete deci-
sions. A more flexible procedure must therefore 
be adopted allowing the Council to be convened 
10 
whenever there is felt to be a need and not merely 
twice a year. 
55. The defence ministers must play a greater 
role with a view to accelerating the process of 
making WEU operational and implementing the 
tasks assigned to it as a result of the entry into 
force of the Maastricht Treaty and of the decisions 
taken at the NATO summit meeting. WEU's deci-
sion to convene a meeting of the chiefs of defence 
staff twice a year prior to the ordinary Ministerial 
Council meetings, and on an ad hoc basis when-
ever necessary, is meaningful only if they receive 
clear political instructions on the objectives of and 
the programme of work for such meetings. 
56. The WEU Luxembourg declaration refers 
to the "progress achieved by the chiefs of defence 
staff in developing a WEU exercise policy". 
However, what are the other objectives of their 
meetings? In order to guarantee the effectiveness 
of the military organs recently created in WEU, a 
definition must quickly be arrived at of the struc-
ture of the relationships and division of responsi-
bilities between: 
- the chiefs of defence staff; 
- the military delegates within the national 
delegations; 
- the Planning Cell; 
- the WEU Secretariat -General. 
57. The Planning Cell, which should have the 
staff and the material resources necessary for it to 
fulfil its tasks - which is not the case at present -
is intended to play a real role in co-ordinating 
operations between WEU and NATO. In particu-
lar it must develop with NATO the concept of the 
formation of the combined joint task forces that 
will be called upon to carry out operations, possi-
bly with the participation of countries that are not 
members of the alliance. It should quickly com-
plete its work on the development of forces ans-
werable to WEU (FAWEU), their command, 
headquarters, logistics, transport and communica-
tions systems, their relations with NATO and the 
procedures for their use in the framework of 
WEU. 
58. It must, in particular, develop operating 
procedures for the European corps which is to be 
placed under WEU authority. The Ministers assi-
gned to the Planning Cell the task of developing a 
plan for setting up European air-maritime forces-
is this plan now ready? Also there is an Italian 
proposal for a multinational land force intended to 
enhance the operational significance of this initia-
tive- what stage has this now reached? 
59. For some time now WEU has been working 
on a study (initially a Franco-German initiative) 
intended to enhance strategic mobility. It is unac-
ceptable for such a study to be continued indefini-
tely without the slightest sign of yielding concrete 
results in the foreseeable future and without the 
Assembly being informed in any way of its aims 
or progress. In order to advance matters in this 
context advantage should be taken of the signing 
in October 1993 of a memorandum of understan-
ding regarding the feasibility study for the Euro-
pean transport aircraft, commissioned from a 
European industrial consortium (Euroflag). It is 
essential to move as soon as possible from the 
study phase to the conclusion of firm contracts. 
60. It is a matter of urgency for the Assembly 
to be informed more closely of the progress of the 
work of the Western European Armaments Group 
(WEAG), the transfer of its secretariat from Lis-
bon to Brussels - which should take place accor-
ding to the Luxembourg declaration in spring 
1994 - the state of advancement of the Euclid 
research programme, the development of a free 
market in Europe for defence equipment and, 
above all, the stage now reached in the studies for 
a European armaments agency (which is the sub-
ject of a report to be tabled by Mr. Borderas on 
behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Com-
mittee). Here too the studies are dragging on and 
it is time decisions were taken. 
61. The initiatives taken by WEU on verifica-
tion of the CFE Treaty and, to an even greater 
extent, on implementation of the Open Skies 
Treaty, for which the WEU countries have formed 
into a group of states, seem very encouraging, 
particularly with regard to the project for co-ope-
ration with Russia and other CIS countries in this 
area. What progress has been made here? The 
WEU Luxembourg declaration offers no answer 
in this respect. 
62. Having established the Torrej6n Satellite 
Centre, officially inaugurated a year ago, the 
Ministers have announced that they are to consi-
der at their next meeting to be held in May 1994 a 
progress report on the possibility of implementing 
a WEU earth observation programme. When will 
we fmally be in a position to take a decision on the 
creation of WED's own space-based surveillance 
system- a decision which, qualitatively, would be 
a step of the highest importance, not just in terms 
of European independence in intelligence matters 
but for the future of the European space industry? 
63. To accelerate the decision-making process 
on all of these projects, WEU must be truly 
capable of demonstrating a collective will and 
determination based on a spirit of European 
defence, of which it is the concrete expression. 
64. However, as Mr. Leotard recently stated: 3 
"WEU is still having problems in finding a 
place between the Atlantic forum and com-
munity life. The common European vision 
of defence matters is slow to take shape. 
3. Speech given in Paris on 3rd March 1994 at a conference 
held by the European Movement. 
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The only missing ingredient is the commit-
ment at the highest political level that alone 
can give the desired impetus to the wish for 
a European defence identity. 
As I understand it, this impetus can come 
only from the common will of heads of 
state and of government of the member 
countries. A WEU summit meeting would 
serve to demonstrate, both symbolically 
and in practical terms, the political vitality 
of this security instrument of the European 
Union and of the European pillar of the 
alliance. It would serve also as an illustra-
tion of the direct interest of the political 
authorities in the European countries and 
confer strong legitimacy on the project the 
organisation embodies. In all democracies, 
the heads of state and of government have 
supreme authority in defence matters and 
are the leaders of the armed forces". 
65. Indeed, this proposal for a WEU summit 
meeting could give the organisation the necessary 
weight and political impetus to make progress in 
achieving the manifold tasks expected of it by 
both the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance 
- organisations at times inclined to treat WEU as 
a secondary authority that might cease to exist in 
the foreseeable future. However, such a project 
would require detailed preparation and must be 
accompanied by a series of concrete proposals 
whose implementation would be of substantial 
service to the cause of a European defence organi-
sation. 
66. Decisions might concern: 
- the creation of European intervention 
forces developed by a multinational joint 
services European headquarters, as the 
French Defence Minister has proposed; 
-the creation of a European air-maritime 
force supported by a multinational ground 
force, as set out in the Italian proposal; 
- priority treatment for projects concerning 
the pooling of joint intelligence means, 
equipment and transport units, logistics 
and, consequently, the release of essential 
funding to allow WEU: 
(i) to set up a European space-based 
observation system; 
( ii) to promote a military transport aircraft 
built by European industry on the basis of 
the feasibility study; 
( iii) to create a European defence industry 
and develop standardised interoperable 
European equipment. This is dependent 
on a final decision to create a properly 
structured European armaments agency 
with real powers and responsibilities. 
WEU capabilities, once operational, could be 
made available to the whole alliance. 
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V. Conclusions 
67. Rarely in the course of its history has WEU 
been countenanced to the degree shown in the 
decision reached by the heads of state and of 
government of the Atlantic Alliance at the summit 
meeting in Brussels last January. It was recogni-
sed and confirmed in its role of European pillar of 
the alliance and was also granted new responsibi-
lities for which the alliance is prepared to make its 
collective means available to WEU. lfWEU is to 
rise to the occasion, an extraordinary effort will 
have to be made to overcome the resulting chal-
lenges. 
68. If WEU fails to take energetic action here 
and now to seize the opportunities just offered by 
the political constellation that led the alliance 
summit meeting to this result, it may miss a 
favourable political juncture that may not be 
encountered again for quite some time. Now is 
indeed the time for WEU to take its place as the 
European defence organisation on which one can 
count as a deciding factor of stability and security 
and also as a player in the areas of its responsibi-
lity. 
69. Yet one has to note that the WEU Council, 
its subsidiary bodies and the Secretariat-General 
seem to be pursuing all their activities in a routine 
manner without any true political impetus. Dis-
cussions become entangled in innumerable details 
of minor importance and the necessary decisions 
cannot be taken or are taken too late. For instance, 
it does not seem to have been realised that the 
achievement of important programmes that WEU 
is certainly studying requires considerable fman-
cial backing and, if it is realised, the courage and 
determination to claim these financial means with 
all necessary force and persuasion are lacking. 
The fact is that the WEU authorities are always 
too concerned about not duplicating the work of 
other organisations and consider themselves 
increasingly as merely having to carry out deci-
sions taken elsewhere. 
70. The WEU Assembly is prepared to afford 
political support to any effort that might help 
WEU to fulfil its increased responsibilities and 
overcome the obstacles of all kinds - political, 
structural or financial - which today prevent it 
from playing the role that is expected of it and thus 
facilitate the necessary decision-taking. To that 
end, the Council should associate the Assembly to 
a greater extent in its thinking by providing it with 
better information on questions of substance. The 
Council should not underestimate the usefulness 
and political weight of an Assembly that has alrea-
dy shown several times in the past that it could 
help in breaking deadlocks. In this context, it 
would also be in the interest of the Council to 
demonstrate publicly that after the entry into force 
of the Maastricht Treaty it continues to count unre-
servedly on the importance of the WEU Assembly 
as the only international assembly with responsibi-
lity in security and defence matters. Such a 
demonstration of confidence on the part of the 
Council would give the Assembly added weight in 
its efforts to improve co-operation with the parlia-
ments and the foreign affairs and defence commit-
tees of the member countries with a view to 
making them better aware of the common cause 
that unites the Council and the Assembly. 
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